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Our intimate relationship with the rest of our Continent is
illustrated by the significant numbers of fellow Africans
who have sought to settle in South Africa since 1994.
Undoubtedly, this trend will continue, adding a new richness to our own society. Many of these new immigrants
bring with them important skills that our country needs.
Many of them are also people who are creative, full of initiative and driven by an enterprising spirit. The more they
impart these characteristics to us as well, the better we will
be as a people and a society. Necessarily, we must continue
to be vigilant against any evidence of xenophobia against
the African immigrants. It is fundamentally wrong and
unacceptable that we should treat people who come to us
as friends as though they are our enemies. We should also
never forget that the same peoples welcomed us to their
own countries when many of our citizens had to go into
exile as a result of the brutality of the apartheid system. To
express the critical importance of Africa to ourselves, both
black and white, we should say that we are either African
or we are nothing.
President Thabo Mbeki in ANC Today, May 2001
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EDITORIAL NOTE
In 2000, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) entered into a
partnership with the Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign of the South
African Human Rights Commission. The two cooperated in offering a
series of country-wide training workshops for media and journalists at
which the results of SAMP research into media xenophobia was presented and discussed. This publication is the second product of that partnership. The paper sets out to critically review and examine the evidence for
the argument that xenophobia is widespread and growing in South
Africa. While it is important to document the scale of the problem and
the enormity of the public education challenge that confronts government and civil society, there are no grounds for defeatism. Rather this
publication is designed to draw attention to a problem that requires attention and a commitment from all South Africans to roll back and defeat
the new apartheid of xenophobia. We would like to particularly thank all
of the researchers and organizations involved in the surveys on which this
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I

n May 2001, President Thabo Mbeki observed that all South
Africans must be vigilant against “any evidence of xenophobia”
against African immigrants. He noted that it is “fundamentally
wrong and unacceptable” that South Africans should treat people
who come to South Africa as friends as though they are enemies. This is
a long-awaited and critically important statement from the highest level
of the South African government. In the aftermath of the World
Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance, the President’s words will hopefully be acted upon by all
South Africans.
What is the evidence of xenophobia against African immigrants to
which the President refers? Evidence of xenophobia can be seen in
high-profile violent assaults on immigrants by bands of citizens (in
which a number of refugees and others have lost their lives). But how
typical are these xenophobic acts? Perhaps, as in some other countries,
these are just the actions of a small group of extremists and are untypical of mainstream attitudes? What do South Africans really think of
non-citizens, of African immigrants, of refugees and asylum-seekers? Are
these attitudes reflected in, or contrary to, official thinking? And how
and why does the media influence attitudes, for better or worse?
In 1997, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC)
identified xenophobia as a major source of concern to human rights and
democracy in the country. Then, in October 1998, the SAHRC (in
partnership with other agencies) launched a public and media education programme known as the Roll Back Xenophobia (RBX) Campaign.
The campaign is designed to send a message, in the words of its founding document, that “South Africa needs to send out a strong message
that an irrational prejudice and hostility towards non-nationals is not
acceptable under any circumstances” (Appendix A). The powerful
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the country’s
largest labour federation, has also condemned the growth of xenophobia
in South Africa in no uncertain terms (Appendix B).
This paper first examines various reports and studies which made the
claims about growing xenophobia in the mid-1990s. The paper shows
that these claims were not based on systematic, national research, but
rather on anecdotal evidence or generalization from small and unrepresentative samples. In 1997, SAMP set out to rectify this problem with a
series of nationally-representative surveys of citizen and non-citizen public attitudes towards immigration and immigrants. To date, the project
has conducted three public opinion surveys of South African attitudes
towards immigration; national public opinion surveys of immigration in
1
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5 other SADC states; and two large surveys of non-citizens living in
South Africa. Together, these surveys provide a unique data base for
accurately assessing the attitudes of citizens and immigrants towards a
wide range of immigration-related issues in the Southern African
region.
The results of these particular surveys, and SAMP research into
xenophobia more generally, have been published elsewhere (see endnotes and Appendix C). This paper presents an overview of the findings
of public opinion surveys conducted from 1997-2000. The basic aims of
this paper are as follows:
• to critically review the evidence for official and other claims
that South Africans are intolerant of outsiders and African
immigrants in particular;
• to summarize the results of various SAMP research into public
opinion (citizen and non-citizen) on immigration issues;
• to analyse the extent and character of “xenophobia” amongst
the populace at large;
• to provide concrete suggestions to government, the ANC,
unions, NGO’s and CSO’s and others for public education and
other initiatives to counteract xenophobia and intolerance;
• to inform the public education strategies of initiatives such as
SAHRC’s Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign.
In order to devise workable and effective strategies for countering
xenophobia, it is extremely important to have a good sense of the
extent of the problem and how it manifests itself. This paper is published in the belief that a greater understanding of this troubling phenomenon will lead to better and more workable counteracting strategies
and policies.
The paper addresses four basic themes:
• the basic level and character of human rights awareness amongst
the South African citizenry;
• citizen views of immigration and the presence of non-citizens in
the country;
• the kinds of rights citizens are willing to extend to non-citizens
including refugees; and
• migrant perceptions of their own treatment in South Africa.
The research shows that government and other agencies have a
major task ahead of them if they are to convince South Africans of the
value of a more open and inclusive immigration policy that is actually
in the interests of the country. Attitudes are currently very negative and
political leadership and public education need to confront this reality at
the outset. The evidence for this assertion is as follows:
• South Africans as a whole are not tolerant of outsiders living in
2
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the country. The surveys revealed strong support for policies that
would place strict limits on or prohibit immigration altogether.
Fully a quarter favour a total ban, considerably more than in any
other country for which there is comparable data. Nearly 80%
favour a total ban or very strict limits. One in five actually feel
that everyone from neighbouring countries living in South
Africa (legally or not) should be sent home. Attitudes have also
hardened. Between 1995 and 1999, for example, support for a
highly restrictionist policy increased from 65% to 78%. Support
for a policy that tied immigration to job availability declined
dramatically from 29% in 1995 to only 12% in 1999.
Between 1996 and 2000, government offered generous legal
amnesties to longstanding contract workers, undocumented
SADC country citizens resident in South Africa, and exMozambican refugees. In total, over 350,000 people benefited
from this effort to compensate black non-citizens for the actions
of apartheid. However, South Africans, in general, do not support the idea of immigration amnesties. Antagonism is particularly intense amongst white respondents (at 76%). Black South
Africans, perhaps more mindful of the history of the antiapartheid struggle, are more generous with 40% unopposed to
granting amnesties to undocumented migrants.
The majority of South Africans currently believe that immigration and migration impact unfavourably on the country (with
nearly 60% believing that they “weaken” society and the economy, and over 60% that they put a strain on South African
resources). Fear of crime, threats to jobs and the economy, and
disease are the leading reasons given for opposition to immigration. These are the same arguments advanced by those who
oppose immigration everywhere.
South Africans favour forceful approaches to controlling immigration. Respondents were asked their opinion of control-oriented policy measures such as turning on the electric fence on
South Africa’s borders; putting more money into border protection; using the army to patrol borders; increasing taxes to pay for
border patrols; requiring foreigners to carry identification; giving
police the right to detain suspected illegal immigrants and
penalizing those who employ illegal immigrants. With the
notable exception of raising taxes, each of the measures enjoyed
wide support with whites again more supportive than blacks.
Respondents were asked what action they would take against
people from neighbouring SADC countries. A third would be
prepared to personally try and prevent migrants from moving
3
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into their neighbourhood, operating a business, becoming a fellow worker or having their children in the same classroom.
They were also asked what they would do if they found out
someone was “illegally” in the country. Forty-seven percent said
they would report them (with 3% saying they would band
together to force the person to leave the area).
The South African Constitution guarantees basic rights and
freedoms to everyone living within the boundaries of the
nation-state. Many South Africans are clearly in disagreement.
Around 40% are opposed to Africans from elsewhere enjoying
the same access to health and educational services as South
Africans. Rather more (54%) oppose giving the same right of
access to housing. On the positive side, the survey found that
47% of respondents feel that Africans from other countries
should still be allowed to vote in elections. Whites are significantly more negative than black South Africans on all of these
issues.
South Africans were asked about their attitudes to giving certain
basic rights (freedom of speech, freedom of movement, legal protection, police protection and access to services) to legal and
unauthorized migrants. There is a consistent pattern of conditional support for rights for temporary migrant workers. While
only a quarter of the population thinks that these rights should
always be accorded to legal migrants, around half are prepared to
see these rights extended in certain circumstances.
When it comes to unauthorized migrants, the picture changes dramatically. Around 85% of respondents feel that these migrants
should have no right to freedom of speech or movement. Some
60-65% also feel that they should not enjoy police or legal protection or access to services. There is clearly a feeling, certainly
not confined to South Africa, that by being in a country without official permission one sacrifices any entitlement to basic
rights and protections, even if (as in South Africa) those are
guaranteed by the constitution.
The SAMP surveys show that South Africans accept that many
newcomers are indeed genuine refugees. They also agree with
the general proposition that refugees warrant protection (with
70% in favour). However, they distinguish between the general
principle of protection and their own government’s responsibility in offering that protection. Only 47% feel that the South
African government should give asylum and protection to
refugees. When asked whether they would personally support
the South African government paying for the cost of sheltering
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refugees, the response was decidedly lukewarm with only 17% in
favour.
An important question is what people understand by “protection” and what rights they are prepared to extend to refugees.
“Protection”, as understood by South Africans, does not extend
to granting basic rights to refugees. Nearly 70% feel that
refugees in the country should never have the rights of freedom
of speech and movement, with only 3% feeling that these are
automatic entitlements. Support for other refugee rights is only
marginally more solid with less than 20% of respondents of the
opinion that refugees should always enjoy legal and police protection in South Africa, or access to basic services. None of this
indicates a citizenry well-educated in the circumstances and
plight of refugees.
One hypothesis in the literature is that proximity to and direct
social interaction with non-citizens will impact citizen attitudes
(negatively or positively). What emerges from the SAMP surveys is that many South Africans have no direct interaction and
experience of foreigners, even from neighbouring states. In the
1998 survey, only 4% of respondents said they had “a great deal
of contact” with people from countries in Southern Africa; with
80% having little or none. Those who have no contact are statistically most likely to have negative opinions of foreigners.
The more contact they have, the more likely they are to have
tolerant opinions. Type of contact is also critical. South Africans
who are friends with foreign citizens are more likely to have positive views than those who live next to, work with or buy things
from them.
Citizens of neighbouring states are evenly divided on whether
they are viewed positively or negatively by South Africans. A
significant minority of people interviewed (30-50%) feel that
South Africans have positive or very positive views of people
from their home country. This suggests that not all migrants
have personally experienced hostility and intolerance. Less than
30% expect bad or very bad treatment from South Africans.
Asked, for example, about their general experiences in South
Africa, 64% said it had been positive or very positive, with only
20% saying it was negative or very negative. The majority of
migrants and immigrants are very much aware of the negativity
that surrounds their presence in the country. However, only
those who have had direct personal experience of hostility, abuse
or prejudice are prepared to translate that general awareness into
a firm belief that South Africans are intolerant and hostile.
5
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This paper shows that South Africans are not tolerant of outsiders.
These feelings are widespread and cut across indicators of age, education, gender, economic status and race (although whites are generally
more hostile than blacks towards African immigrants). Many migrants
and immigrants are aware that South Africans are not favourably disposed towards them. Yet they are also surprisingly generous in their
expectations of South Africans. They expect to be treated well and,
with the exception of those who have had direct negative experiences,
they believe that they will be, not only by ordinary South Africans but
by the police as well. But the situation is finely balanced.
The majority of South Africans are attitudinally hostile to outsiders
but that they are not yet prepared to translate those attitudes into
action; at worst they are “latent xenophobes.” The single biggest mitigator of negative stereotyping is personal familiarity. In other words, as
South Africans become more socially familiar with non-South Africans
their attitudes begin to change positively. This, in turn, suggests that
public education programmes alone (the preaching of tolerance and
good neighbourliness in the abstract) are unlikely to be successful
Of particular concern are attitudes to “refugee protection.” There
should be great cause for concern that the reluctance to grant rights to
refugees is uncomfortably close to the set of responses given for “illegal
immigrants.” South Africans clearly continue to have difficulty distinguishing in their own minds between refugees and migrants. Government,
NGO’s and refugee organizations have a major task to turn some latent
sympathy for refugees into widespread popular support for genuine refugee
protection that is consistent with South Africa’s convention obligations.
South Africa has made enormous strides since 1994 in building a
non-racial, human rights culture appropriate to the new democratic
order. But there are clearly considerable obstacles to be overcome before
the citizenry is prepared to embrace the notion of equal treatment for
foreigners and to ensure that African migrants (whether legal or undocumented) are constitutionally entitled to basic human and labour rights,
simply by virtue of being on South African soil.
It is hard to see how even the best of public education campaigns
can, in isolation, effect the necessary shift in public attitudes. In that
context, the World Conference provides an opportunity for South
Africans to reflect and seek advice on how to turn back the insidious
tide of racism and xenophobia. What is required from those in government, civil society and the media is a new approach. Instead of isolating
and stigmatizing all migrants as “aliens” and “foreigners” or preaching
against xenophobia in the abstract, there needs to be acceptance and
promotion of the presence and contribution that non-citizens are, and
can, make to the country’s growth and development.
6
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INTRODUCTION

S

outh Africa’s first democratic election in 1994 marked the formal end of three hundred years of institutionalized racism in the
country. South Africa was also the site of one of the twentieth
century’s most degrading social engineering experiments in
institutionalized racism. Apartheid systematically entrenched racial discrimination in all spheres of political, economic, social and cultural life.
The fall of apartheid in the 1980s and 1990s officially ended a system
that was a fundamental affront to basic human rights and dignity. The
vision of a new “rainbow nation” was born and enshrined in one of the
most progressive constitutions in the world.1
Seven years later, South Africa is still one of the most race-conscious
societies in the world, so deep are the divides of the past. The legacy of
apartheid and institutionalized racism will take decades to rectify. So
will the racial attitudes and practices that formed the bedrock of white
support for the apartheid system. No longer sanctioned or promoted by
the state, racism continues below the surface as disaffected and alienated whites contemplate the implications of the loss of historical privilege. As a result, the African National Congress (ANC) government
and the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) have
both recently declared that the racism remains one of the major hurdles
to the building of a truly democratic and participatory South African
nation.2
Those seeking confirmation of the accuracy of this claim need look
no further than November 2000 and a televised event that shocked the
international community.3 In the episode in question, six white South
African policemen set dogs on three defenceless black men and subjected them to a torrent of racist abuse. Hardened journalists such as Max
du Preez of the Johannesburg Star called it “the worst pornography of
racism and violence” that he had witnessed in three decades of reporting in South Africa. In the past, such activities were routinely sanctioned by the apartheid state. Now six white police officers are on trial
in Pretoria on charges of assault and attempted murder.
For many, this violent incident (and others like it) confirm the
ANC’s argument that white racism remains alive and well in South
Africa. The angry response of the media and the politicians suggest that
human rights abuses motivated by racism will not be tolerated in a
democratic country. Several prominent politicians, including Minister
of Safety and Security Steve Tshwete, condemned the attack and called
for the rooting out of “rogue elements” in the South African police services.4 This is significant, too, for Mr Tshwete had earlier criticized local
human rights groups for their opposition to police methods during a
7
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national crime-fighting blitz known as “Operation Crackdown.”5
What, however, if the focus shifts for a moment from the perpetrators to the victims of this act of police brutality? The three men in question were not black South Africans at all but Mozambicans living in
South Africa. Over 300,000 Mozambicans live quite legally in South
Africa. Yet these men were depicted, without substantiating proof, as
“illegal immigrants” in the South African press, as if this somehow mitigated the brutality of the attack.6 They were caught up in the dragnet of
a massive country-wide police and army operation to identify and
deport undocumented migrants, particularly Mozambicans. This campaign (conducted by the police, army and Department of Home Affairs)
began in earnest in the 1980s and escalated dramatically after 1994.7
Over 600,000 migrants have been deported by the South African
government in the last five years, the vast majority to Mozambique
(over 85%).8 Independent investigations by Human Rights Watch and
the SAHRC argue that the methods used by the police and army resemble apartheid-era police tactics used to enforce pass laws and influx controls on black South Africans. The reports also maintain that abuse,
bribery and corruption riddle the deportation system.9 Sectoral research
by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) shows that many
migrants also enjoy very little protection at the place of employment
(primarily in the agriculture, mining, construction and services
sectors).10
Migrants from South Africa’s neighbours enjoyed few rights and little legal protection during the apartheid era. The question is why this
has apparently continued. Several inter-related factors are relevant:
• South Africa was unprepared for the inevitable consequences of
the fall of apartheid and the new migration movements accompanying globalization. The country was generally not a desirable
destination for African and other migrants before the 1990s.11
The new South Africa was far more attractive in itself and as a
stepping-stone to other destinations. The variety and volume of
migrants and asylum-seekers arriving in the country changed significantly after 1990, certainly not to the “illegal millions” of
popular perception but sufficient to fuel a perception that the
country had lost control of its borders.12
• Many in the country have ascribed to a strong anti-immigration
mind-set that views immigration as a threat to nation-building
and incorrectly views immigration and migration, by definition,
as bad for citizens. The resulting support for restrictionist policies that prioritize control over management, expulsion over
admission, exclusion over inclusion is clear.13 The numbers of
“illegal aliens” are consistently exaggerated and all are stereo8
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typed as a threat to the social and economic rights of South
Africans.14 A hostile public climate such as this places few constraints on the behaviour of the agents of the state who police
“immigration.”
Immigration policy has continued to be governed since 1994 by
the Aliens Control Act of 1991, a piece of legislation sometimes
dubbed “apartheid’s last act.”15 Human rights violations are
enabled by existing legislation which promotes summary arrest
and deportation with the barest of due process.16 In marked contrast to the rights-based focus of much post-apartheid transformation, few are openly supportive of migrant rights.17
The Bill of Rights in the Constitution guarantees a host of basic
political, cultural and socio-economic rights to all who are resident in the country. The courts have been active in ensuring
that the basic constitutional rights of non-citizens are not violated by the Department of Home Affairs. In a succession of
court challenges over the last five years, foreign citizens have
won virtually every case against the Department’s interpretation
of current immigration law.18 The Department, in turn, has been
publically criticized by several judges for its failure to observe
basic rules of due process and equality before the law. However,
to date the majority of challenges have been mounted by middle-class people with the resources for legal assistance. Most of
those targeted for deportation by the police lack these resources
and means of defence. None of the human rights groups or
lawyers involved in this area has yet mounted a legal challenge
against the deportation system per se, although the South
African Human Rights Commission has been active in exposing
it to public scrutiny.
The Minister of Home Affairs tabled a new immigration bill in
1999 which would make no fundamental change to the current
policing system; rather, it seeks to extend and consolidate the
powers of enforcement by heavily penalizing South Africans who
aid undocumented migrants, making it illegal to provide basic
services (such as health and education) to people who do not
have proof of identity, and requiring South Africans to report
anyone they suspect of being an “illegal foreigner.” These are
standard enforcement tactics worldwide; the problem comes in
how they are interpreted and implemented and what safeguards
are built into the system to protect the rights of citizens and noncitizens. Critics have charged that these particular proposals
amount to a citizen licence for xenophobic action and the ANC
is now taking these charges seriously.19
9
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Claims about growing anti-foreign intolerance in South Africa have,
to date, been based largely on anecdote or on studies of particular communities. There is no way of knowing from these studies how widespread such attitudes actually are. Perhaps they are held only by a small
minority of citizens and the majority see no reason for alarm?
In order to devise workable and effective strategies for countering
xenophobia, it is extremely important to have a good sense of the
extent of the problem and how it manifests itself. The best method for
finding this out is through nationally-representative surveying of citizen
attitudes.
Internationally, national public opinion surveys are an important
window onto the public climate on immigration.20 Policy-makers find
them a useful mechanism for assessing levels of support for existing or
new policy initiatives. Public education campaigners can engage in far
more targeted programmes designed to build tolerance and foster integration. Human rights groups can identify whether the potential for
abuse of migrants rights is systemic or localized.
In 1997, the SAMP began to conduct a series of nationally-representative surveys of citizen attitudes towards immigration in seven SADC
countries (South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique,
Namibia and Zimbabwe). This paper summarizes the findings of these
surveys for the case of South Africa. The main purpose is to try and
assess the full extent of negative South African attitudes towards
migrants, refugees and human rights, and to identify specific areas
where policy-makers and civil society should concentrate their efforts to
reverse this unhealthy and divisive phenomenon.
This paper focuses on various themes that have emerged during the
course of this collaborative international migration research endeavour.
The paper addresses four basic themes:
• the basic level and character of human rights awareness amongst
the South African citizenry;
• citizen views of immigration and the presence of non-citizens in
the country;
• the kinds of rights citizens are willing to extend to non-citizens
including refugees; and
• migrant perceptions of their own treatment in South Africa.
The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these
findings for effective migration management, public education and
entrenching an inclusive human rights culture in South Africa.

10
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THE RISE OF XENOPHOBIA

C

laims that South Africans were becoming increasingly antagonistic towards foreign citizens began to surface in the mid1990s.21 Focus group studies of South African political attitudes in 1995 were the first to unveil a surprising amount of
latent hostility towards foreign migrants.22 Local studies of particular
communities have since confirmed that many black foreign citizens feel
that there is considerable verbal and physical antagonism towards their
presence.23 Several writers suggested that apartheid-era solidarities
between black people of whatever national origin were crumbling even
as the new, post-apartheid South African nation-building project redefined the boundaries of “us” and “them.”24
Violent attacks on non-South African traders erupted on the sidewalks of Johannesburg in 1996 and assaults on foreign citizens became
increasingly common in a number of cities.25 This culminated in 1998
with the death of three foreign citizens on a moving train at the hands
of a group of South Africans returning from a rally of the unemployed
in Pretoria. Meanwhile, South African MP’s were receiving increasingly
strident complaints from their constituents about the presence of foreign citizens in their neighbourhoods. Studies of media coverage of
immigration issues and the public utterances of elected officials from all
of South Africa’s political parties suggested that the view on the streets
was echoed in newsrooms and the corridors of the state.26
The first attempt to measure public attitudes at a national scale was
in October 1994 when the state-funded Human Sciences Research
Council (HSRC) included a small number of questions about immigration in a general random survey of 2,200 South Africans. Follow-up surveys at regular intervals allowed the HSRC to track changing attitudes
and to conclude that between 1994 and 1995 there was “a considerable
growth in negative sentiments, in other words xenophobia, towards illegal/immigrants/aliens.”27 However, these results seemed questionable
since the survey used leading questions which were almost bound to
elicit negative responses.28 The HSRC survey was also more about attitudes to policy than attitudes to people.
Human Rights Watch, the international human rights monitoring
organization, conducted a South African field investigation in 1998 and
concluded:
South Africa has become increasingly xenophobic in
recent years, with a large percentage of South Africans perceiving foreigners – especially, almost exclusively black foreigners – as a direct threat to their future economic well11
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being and as responsible for the troubling rise in violent
crime in South Africa.29
While HRW’s researchers reported numerous individual incidents of
human rights abuse of migrants, their claims about the pervasiveness of
xenophobia were not based on primary research.
In 1997, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) embarked
on an ambitious programme of public opinion surveying in relation to
migration and immigration within and to the SADC. To date, the project has conducted the following national surveys:30
• 1998 national South African public opinion survey of diversity
attitudes which included a variety of questions on attitudes to
immigrants and migrants (sample size: 3,200);
• 1998 national public opinion survey of attitudes to migration to
South Africa conducted simultaneously in three SADC countries (Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Mozambique) and subsequently in
two others (Botswana and Namibia) (sample size: 3,500),
• 1998 attitudinal survey of migrants from other African countries
living in South Africa (sample size: 501)
• 1999 national South African public opinion survey of attitudes
to human rights, migrants and refugees (sample size: 1,600)
• 1999 national survey of skilled South Africans on attitudes
towards emigration (sample size: 725)
• 1999 attitudinal survey of skilled non-citizens living in South
Africa on attitudes and treatment in South Africa (sample size:
400)
Another round of surveys is planned for 2001. Together, these surveys provide a unique database for accurately assessing the attitudes of
citizens and immigrants towards a wide range of immigration-related
issues in the Southern African region.31

SOUTH AFRICAN ATTITUDES TO IMMIGRATION

W

hile South Africa is not an “immigration country” in the
conventional sense, the vast majority of its white population are either immigrants or the descendants of immigrants who arrived in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.32 For decades, successive white governments aggressively pursued racist and highly selective immigration policies. Prior to
the late 1990s, all immigrants had to be “assimilable by the white population.” In the minds of white South Africans, immigration was the key
to survival. In the minds of their black counterparts, immigration was
another instrument of racial oppression.

12
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After 1994, the new South African government initially became
strongly anti-immigrationist, justified primarily in terms of the threat to
jobs for citizens.33 Legal immigration dropped to an all-time low (less
than 10,000 per annum by the late 1990s). Temporary residence and
work permits became harder to obtain. This occurred just as South
Africa opened itself up again to the world and despite numerous complaints from South African and multi-national companies seeking to
access the global skills market.
During the late 1990s, there was no obvious appetite for immigration
or migration at the highest levels.34 Yet, the vast majority of South
Africans surveyed (87% in 1998) still felt that too many foreign citizens
were being allowed into the country, a view shared by both black and
white (Table 1).
Table 1: South African Attitudes to Volume of Immigration
Is South Africa letting in too many, too few,
or about the right number of foreigners? (%)

White

Black

Total

Too few

5

6

6

Right number

11

5

8

Too many

84

90

87

Source: 1998 SAMP South African Survey. Totals may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

The international data presented in Table 2 suggests that, compared
with other nations, South Africans rate among the most unfriendly to
outsiders. There is widespread support for policies that would place
strict limits on or prohibit in-migration altogether. Fully a quarter of
respondents favour a total ban on immigration and migration, considerably more than in any other country for which there is comparable data.
Nearly 80% favour a total ban or very strict limits. One in five actually
feel that everyone from neighbouring countries living in South Africa
(legally or not) should be sent home.35 Table 2 also shows that attitudes
have hardened rapidly. Between 1995 and 1999, for example, support
for a highly restrictionist policy increased from 65% to 78%.
Corresponding support for a policy that tied immigration to job availability has declined dramatically from 29% in 1995 to only 12% in 1999.
Various more liberal migration policy initiatives by the government
have not enjoyed public support. Between 1996 and 2000, the government offered legalization amnesties to longstanding contract workers,
SADC country citizens resident in South Africa, and ex-Mozambican
refugees.36 In total, over 350,000 people benefited from this effort to
compensate people for the actions of the apartheid government. There
was little public debate before or during these amnesties and government did not gauge the level of public support for the amnesties. This
13
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Table 2: South African Attitudes in Comparative Perspective
Let anyone in Let people
who wants
to enter (%)

Place strict

come as long limits on the
as there are

numbers of

Prohibit

Don’t

people

know

coming here

(%)

jobs available foreigners

from other

(%)

countries (%)

who can
come here (%)

South Africa 1999

2

12

53

25

7

South Africa 1998

6

17

45

25

7

South Africa 1995

6

29

49

16

0

Russia 1995

6

48

28

18

2

Philippines 1995

9

16

63

12

0

Peru 1995

8

39

40

12

4

China 1995

7

33

40

11

9

Argentina 1995

8

49

31

9

3

United States 1995

5

32

53

8

0

Finland 1995

8

30

51

8

3

Taiwan 1995

2

16

30

7

45

Japan 1995

4

41

40

6

8

Chile 1995

10

50

31

7

1

Nigeria 1995

18

37

40

6

3

Spain 1995

14

55

23

4

3

Zimbabwe 1997

16

30

48

4

0

Australia 1995

5

52

39

3

2

Southern

12

61

23

2

0

Sweden 1995

8

32

55

1

3

Lesotho 1997

61

23

12

3

1

Mozambique 1997

was probably as well, since there appears to be widespread opposition to
the whole idea (Table 3). Antagonism is particularly intense amongst
white respondents (at 76%). Black South Africans, perhaps more mindful of the history of the anti-apartheid struggle, are more generous
though the majority (59%) oppose the principle of granting of
amnesties to undocumented migrants.
The majority of South Africans believe that immigration and migration impact unfavourably on the country (with nearly 60% believing
that they “weaken” society and the economy, and over 60% that they
put a strain on South African resources).37 Fear of crime, disease and
loss of jobs are the leading reasons for opposition to immigration (Table
14
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4). These are the core arguments of those who oppose immigration
everywhere.38 As Mattes et al point out: “South Africans not only hold
negative attitudes towards foreigners, they also have a readily accessible
set of stereotypes with which to justify or rationalise their negative attitudes.”39
South Africans favour vigorous approaches to controlling immigration. In the 1998 SAMP survey, respondents were asked their opinion
of control-oriented policy measures such as turning on the electric fence
on South Africa’s borders; putting more money into border protection;
using the army to patrol borders; increasing taxes to pay for border
patrols; requiring foreigners to carry identification; giving police the
right to detain suspected illegal immigrants and penalizing those who
employ illegal immigrants. With the notable exception of raising taxes,
each of the measures enjoyed massive support with whites again more
hostile than blacks (Table 5).
These views have serious rights-based implications. There is comprehensive endorsement of the controversial army and police role in immigration control. Even more startling is the degree of support for using
Table 3: Attitudes Towards Amnesty
Would you support or oppose the government
offering amnesty to all foreigners now living
illegally inside the country? (%)

Total

Black

White

Support

14

18

3

Neither support nor oppose

17

18

13

Oppose

59

55

76

Don’t know/haven’t heard enough

9

9

8

Source: 1998 SAMP South African Survey

Table 4: Perceived Threats from Immigration
What, if anything, do you have to fear from people
living here from neighbouring countries?
(% of sample that cited each item)

Total

Black

White

Criminal threat

48

40

45

Threat to jobs and economy

37

37

56

Threat of disease

29

30

16

Nothing to fear

24

26

24

Over-population

9

9

8

Making housing shortages worse

3

3

6

Threat to land

1

2

2

Cultural differences

1

2

0

Note: Columns add up to more than 100% due to the fact that respondents gave more than one response.
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Table 5: Attitudes to Government Policing Measures
Would you support or oppose the government taking
the following actions (% support)

White Black Total

Using the army to patrol South Africa’s borders

82

Giving police the right to detain suspected illegal immigrants

81

83

90

78

82

Penalizing businesses or persons who employ illegal immigrants 87

75

79

Requiring foreigners to carry identification with them at all times 80

68

72

Turning on the electric fence that surrounds part of

73

64

66

69

55

59

13

22

22

South Africa’s borders
Allocating more money from the national budget to border
protection
Increasing taxes to cover the expense of increased patrols
Source: 1998 SAMP South African Survey

electrified fences on the borders. These lethal fences were erected by
the apartheid government to deter ANC guerillas and Mozambican
refugees and are no longer operational. Over 70% of respondents feel
that non-citizens should carry documentation with them at all times,
something that also harkens back to the apartheid-era pass laws and is
unconstitutional.40
A significant minority of people are not prepared to leave the policing of migration solely to the authorities. Respondents were asked
whether they would take action against people from neighbouring
SADC countries. Table 6 shows that a third of the respondents would
be prepared to personally try and prevent migrants from moving into
their neighbourhood, operating a business, becoming a fellow worker or
having their children in the same classroom. They were also asked what
they would do if they found out someone was “illegally” in the country.
Forty-seven percent said they would report them (with 3% saying they
would band together to force the person to leave the area). This climate
ensures that there would be generous take-up of the government’s controversial plan to make communities and service providers legally
responsible for identifying and reporting “illegal foreigners.”
These responses come from a citizenry that can only feel it is under
siege from the outside. Whether it is, in fact, is questionable.41 But there
is no doubt that public attitudes have been fanned by highly emotional
media images that portray South Africa as “flooded” or “overrun” by
undocumented migrants from the rest of Africa (or “illegal aliens” as
they are invariably called).42 So nervous are South Africans that most
are prepared to endorse unconstitutional measures to police immigration. This mentality may help explain why there is so little scrutiny or
accountability in police and army policing methods and so little public
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Table 6: Likelihood of Taking Action Against Foreigners
How likely is it that you would take part in action to
prevent people who have come to SA from other
countries in Southern Africa from doing the following
activities? (% who said “likely” or “very likely”)
Total

Black

White

Moving into your neighbourhood

36

32

34

Operating a business in your area

34

65

32

Sitting in class with your child

31

34

27

Becoming one of your coworkers

32

35

27

Source: 1998 SAMP South African Survey

outcry when the rights of migrants are compromised.43 Indeed, as the
next section suggests, South Africans are not strong believers in rights
for migrants and non-citizens in their country.

ARE HUMAN RIGHTS FOR EVERYONE?

T

he South African Constitution has been widely praised as
amongst the most progressive and inclusive in the world. Not
only does its Bill of Rights guarantee unprecedented rights
and freedoms but it extends these same rights to everyone living within the boundaries of the nation-state. Only two sets of rights
are expressly reserved to citizens: (a) the right to vote; and (b) the right
to engage in freedom of trade, occupation and profession. All other
rights are extended to all “persons” in the country.
The flowering of a human rights culture since 1994 has been
enhanced by the high-profile activities of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC), watchdogs such as the South African Human
Rights Commission (SAHRC), Public Protector’s Office and
Commission for Gender Equality, and the judgements of an activist
Constitutional Court. The question, though, is whether ordinary South
Africans have embraced the new “official” human rights culture and,
indeed, how the populace understands the concepts and essence of
“human rights” protection in the first place.
A 1998 survey of human rights awareness conducted by the
Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE, 1998) suggests that
negative attitudes towards migrants may be part of a broader problem.
Knowledge of the existence of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, for
example, is low in the South African population with only 55% of
respondents having actually heard of it. Awareness is greater amongst
urban populations and amongst whites (80% versus 50% of Africans)
and increases with level of education. Very few (18%) say they have
received any kind of formal explanation or training about the contents
17
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of the Bill of Rights.
Well over half of those surveyed (56%) thought that the rights guaranteed by the Constitution were for South Africans only. The survey
showed overwhelming support for the death penalty (with 73% in
favour) and significant levels of homophobia (with 51% saying that
homosexuals should be treated differently from everyone else), both of
which are unconstitutional. There was also massive support for the
proposition that “the Constitution gives too many rights to criminals”
(with 69% in favour). The survey report concluded that “levels of
knowledge about the range of rights included in the Bill of Rights
remain highly uneven among state officials and the general population
alike.”44
SAMP’s research has focused more specifically on the question of
rights for migrants. Large numbers of South Africans are clearly in disagreement with aspects of their own Bill of Rights. On the positive side,
the 1998 survey found that 47% of respondents feel that Africans from
other countries should still be allowed to vote in elections (now an
unconstitutional proposition). On the negative side, around 40% were
opposed to Africans from elsewhere enjoying the same access to health
and educational services as South Africans. Rather more (54%) opposed
giving the same right of access to housing. Whites were significantly
more negative than black South Africans on all of these issues (Table 7).
South Africans display distinctive negative reactions to Africans from
elsewhere on the continent. Asked to choose, South Africans of all races
show definite preferences for European and North American immigrants.
Migrants from neighbouring countries within the SADC are viewed only
marginally more favourably than those from elsewhere in Africa.
The 1999 SAMP survey provided a more detailed profile since it
asked respondents what kinds of rights should be given to which kinds
of people (Table 8). Respondents were asked to say whether they
thought a particular right should be granted to the group in question:
Table 7: Attitudes Towards Rights for Immigrants
What about government policy toward people from
other African countries who are in SA? Would you
support or oppose giving them the following?
(% Opposed)

Black

White

The same access to medical service as South Africans 39

34

61

The same access to a house as South Africans

54

50

69

The same access to education as South Africans

39

36

57

The right to vote in SA elections

53

49

74

The right to become a citizen of SA

44

44

51

Source: 1998 SAMP South African Survey
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citizens, (legal) temporary workers, and “illegal immigrants.”45
Table 8 shows, first, that there is overwhelming support for citizen
access to the rights of freedom of speech and movement, legal protection, police protection and access to services.
Second, there is a consistent pattern of conditional support for rights
for legal temporary migrant workers. While only a quarter of the population thinks that these rights should always be accorded to legal
migrants, around half are prepared to see these rights extended in certain circumstances. Only in the case of freedom of speech and movement are people less generous.
Third, when it comes to unauthorized migrants, the picture changes
dramatically. Some 85% of respondents feel that these migrants should
have no right to freedom of speech or movement. And 60-65% feel that
they should not enjoy police or legal protection or access to services.
There is clearly a predominant feeling, certainly not confined to South
Africa, that by being in a country without official permission one sacrifices any entitlement to basic rights and protections, even if (as in
South Africa) those are guaranteed by the constitution.46
Table 8: South African Attitudes to Rights for Citizens and Migrants
Always (% )

Sometimes1 (%) Never (%)

Should be Granted Right to Freedom of Speech and Movement
Citizens

86

13

1

Temporary Workers

13

43

44

Illegal Immigrants

3

13

84

Should be Granted Right to Legal Protection2
Citizens

91

9

1

Temporary Workers

24

53

23

Illegal Immigrants

8

29

62

Should be Granted Right to Police Protection3
Citizens

93

7

1

Temporary Workers

30

46

24

Illegal Immigrants

11

27

61

Should be Granted Right to Social Services4
Citizens

96

4

0

Temporary Workers

30

46

25

Illegal Immigrants

9

28

63

1 Literally “Depends on the circumstances”
2 “Including not being detained without trial or having a lawyer in court”
3 “Including freedom from illegal searches and to have property protected”
4 “Such as education, housing, health care and water”
Source: 1999 SAMP South Africa Survey
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ATTITUDES TO REFUGEE PROTECTION

I

n 1998, South Africa passed its first-ever refugee legislation. Some
commentators were sceptical, arguing that South Africa was opting
for an essentially unworkable set of solutions to refugee protection.47 But the new Refugee Act was widely hailed by government
and NGO’s as a progressive yet firm piece of legislation which would
enable South Africa to honour the conventions, afford protection to
those in need, and terminate abuse of the system by bogus claimants.48
SAMP research provides insights into the response of South
Africans to the idea of refugee protection and what rights refugees
should be entitled to. While the idea of “illegal immigration” is, by definition, likely to elicit negative responses, the same cannot be said for
“refugees.” Numerous black South Africans, including many in government, were themselves refugees in the past. South Africa is also a signatory to the UN and OAU Conventions. Yet, despite the best efforts of
the UNHCR, the National Refugee Forum and the South African
Human Rights Commission, there has been a strong suspicion that most
South Africans regard the refugees in their midst as fakes and fraudsters.
The SAMP 1999 survey, however, shows that South Africans are
prepared to accept that many newcomers to South Africa are indeed
genuine refugees. Whites believe that one-quarter of all newcomers are
refugees, and blacks one-fifth.
South Africans surveyed also agree with the general proposition that
refugees warrant protection. However, they distinguish between the
general principle of protection and their own government’s responsibility in offering that protection. Nearly 70% agree or strongly agree that
refugees warrant protection. In contrast, only 47% feel that the South
African government should give asylum and protection to refugees
(Table 9). Only 20% are opposed or strongly opposed, however. This
response may seem encouraging. But when asked whether they would
personally support the South African government paying for the cost of
sheltering refugees, the response was decidedly lukewarm with only 17%
in favour and 55% opposed.
An important question is what people understand by “protection”
and what rights they are prepared to extend to refugees. “Protection”, as
understood by South Africans, does not extend to granting basic rights
to refugees. As Table 10 shows, nearly 70% of respondents feel that
refugees in the country should never have the rights of freedom of
speech and movement, with only 3% feeling that these are automatic
entitlements. This suggests that proposals for holding centres for
refugees would probably meet with very little public opposition.
Support for other refugee rights is only marginally more solid with
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Table 9: South African Attitudes to Refugee Protection

Strongly agree/support

“Refugees1 Deserve
Protection” (%)

“South Africa Should
Protect Refugees” (%)

22

11

Agree/support

45

37

Indifferent

12

33

Disagree/Opposed

15

14

Strongly Disagree/Opposed

6

5

1 Defined as people escaping war and religious/ethnical/racial/political persecution in their own countries.
Source: 1999 SAMP South Africa Survey

Table 10: South African Attitudes to Rights for Refugees
Always (% ) Sometimes1 (%)Never (%)

3.3

27.3

69.3

Should be Granted Right to Legal Protection2 13.3

43.5

42.8

Should be Granted Right to Police Protection 16.7

40.7

42.2

Should be Granted Right to Social Services4

40.6

42.4

Should be Granted Right to Freedom of
Speech and Movement

3

16.9

1 Literally “Depends on the circumstances”
2 “Including not being detained without trial or having a lawyer in court”
3 “Including freedom from illegal searches and to have property protected”
4 “Such as education, housing, health care and water”
Source: 1999 SAMP South Africa Survey

less than 20% of respondents of the opinion that refugees should always
enjoy legal and police protection in South Africa, or access to basic services. None of this indicates a citizenry well-educated in the circumstances and plight of refugees. “Protection” is defined in very narrow
terms. There should be great cause for concern that the reluctance to
grant rights to refugees is uncomfortably close to the set of responses
given for “illegal immigrants” (Table 8). South Africans clearly continue to have difficulty distinguishing in their own minds between refugees
and migrants. Government, NGO’s and refugee organizations have a
major task ahead of them to turn some latent sympathy for refugees into
widespread popular support for genuine refugee protection that is consistent with South Africa’s convention obligations.

NON-CITIZEN ATTITUDES TO SOUTH AFRICA

I

n this, the final section of the paper, attention turns to the objects
of anti-immigrant hostility. Since the majority of research to date on
victimization has been anecdotal, SAMP conducted large-scale survey research amongst migrants to collect information on their own
perceptions of how they are viewed by South Africans. Nationally repre21
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sentative sampling is extremely problematical since no-one is sure of the
size or location of all non-citizens in the country. SAMP therefore
devised a strategy to sample a general stratified sample of 500 noncitizens in the country, and a targeted sample of skilled non-citizens living in South Africa. A third source of data was the nationally representative surveys of citizens of the surrounding states of Botswana, Lesotho,
Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe.
Open-ended interviews and community case studies reveal a persistent pattern of verbal and physical harassment. The South African
Human Rights Commission, for example, after interviewing detainees at
a facility for deportees recently concluded:
Arrested persons were deliberately prevented from providing accurate documents, valid identity documents were
destroyed, bribes were taken for avoiding arrest or for
release without documentation and processes were delayed
by inefficient methods and insufficient communication
between the different departments. As a consequence,
many persons with valid documents were arrested.49
Treatment by ordinary citizens appears to be no more tolerant or
humane. A recent study of city Johannesburg notes:
It is clear that being a black foreigner ... is no protection
from racism, especially if you are from a country north of
South Africa’s neighbouring states. Instead, black foreigners from these countries can expect to experience the same
levels of abuse, discrimination and stereotyping endured by
black aliens in other parts of the world.50
South Africans are, it is true, far from unique. But there is still puzzlement amongst African migrants who had imagined that South
Africans, particularly black South Africans, would be more welcoming.
Another study of migrants in Cape Town and Johannesburg, found a
“significant level of public and official hostility” articulated by her subjects: “a common theme is the hostility that they face. Many migrants
respond with anger and indignation” given the fact their earlier support
of the anti-apartheid struggle. As one said “We have never treated them
like they do to us.”51
Many of the migrants interviewed in these studies were not from the
SADC region and were relatively well-educated. There was an assumption amongst researchers – perhaps because of the longstanding migration ties of South Africa and its immediate neighbours – that migrants
from countries such as Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland and even
Zimbabwe and Malawi might be viewed more favourably. This is called
22
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into question by a study of long-time Mozambican residents of
Winterveld near Pretoria which identifies a significant shift in South
African attitudes around 1994:
Having been promised formal inclusion into the new
democratic South African state and having been encouraged to claim and consolidate a South African identity,
they are now increasingly defined and treated as “outsiders”
on the basis of their national identity. A previously shared
and inclusive racial identity has been substituted with an
exclusive national identity.52
The suggestion seems to be that South African attitudes changed
significantly as a result of the post-1994 nation-building project. The
change impacted not only migrants but non-citizen residents, including
those of the same ethnic and cultural background as many South
Africans (i.e. from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland).
Dodson and Oelefse argue that “xenophobia” in South Africa needs
to understood in terms of a “nesting of scales” from the local to the global, identifying which processes operate at what scale. They caution that
there is a tendency to “generalize” xenophobia, to see all South Africans
as involved, thus “extending to the national scale competition and conflict which are far more localized in causation, character and extent.”53
Nevertheless, the local case-study evidence suggests a remarkable
similarity of attitude and perception amongst South Africa that is not
place-dependent. Similarly, there is no suggestion in the case-study literature that attitudes vary significantly by race, gender, age or educational level (though several comment on the particular hostility of
black South Africans to West and Francophone Africans). The evidence presented in this paper confirms the widespread nature of hostility with representative national survey data.
One hypothesis is that proximity to and direct social interaction
with non-citizens will impact upon citizen attitudes (negatively or positively). What emerges from the SAMP surveys, first, is that many South
Africans have no direct interaction and experience of foreigners, even
from neighbouring states. As Table 11 shows, only 4% of respondents in
Table 11: Personal Contact with Non-citizens
1998

1999

Great deal of contact

4

8

Some contact

15

29

Hardly any contact

20

16

No contact

60

44

Source: 1998 and 1999 SAMP Surveys
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the 1998 Survey said they had “a great deal of contact” with people
from countries in Southern Africa; with 80% having little or none.
The 1999 Survey attempted a more sophisticated understanding by
building in questions about types of contact and interaction.
Correlations between views and contact show that those with no contact are statistically most likely to have negative opinions. The more
contact they have, the more likely they are to have tolerant opinions.54
Type of contact is also critical. South Africans who are friends with foreign citizens are more likely to have positive views than those who live
next to, work with or buy things from them. This finding is the major
positive aspect is an otherwise depressing picture. Table 11 also seems to
indicate that the frequency of interaction may itself be on the rise, with
7.8% of 1999 respondents saying they have a great deal of contact and
only 60% saying they have little or none.
In general, citizens of neighbouring states are evenly divided on
whether they are viewed positively or negatively by South Africans. This
finding seems surprising but suggests that not all migrants have personally
experienced hostility and intolerance. Tables 12 and 13 takes the analysis
a step further to ask questions about perceptions of South African attitudes and treatment. A significant minority of people interviewed (3050%) feel that South Africans have a positive or very positive views of
people from their home country. At the same time, the majority still do
not feel that South Africans have a particularly positive view.
When asked what kind of treatment they personally would expect in
South Africa, there was even greater optimism (Table 13) with less than
30% in each case expecting bad or very bad treatment. Most would
expect better treatment from other non-South Africans than they
would from citizens but the differences are not massive. What is clear is
the different responses from Lesotho/Namibia and
Mozambique/Zimbabwe vis-a-vis all of the questions asked. People from
Mozambique and Zimbabwe expect significantly worse treatment from
South Africans, immigration officials and the police. This perception is
Table 12: Perceptions of South African Attitudes
Do South Africans have a positive or negative view of people from your country who
go to live and work in South Africa?
Lesotho

Mozambique

Namibia

Zimbabwe

Very negative

23

5

12

14

Negative

19

23

12

25

Neither

4

16

22

12

Positive

31

37

17

25

Very positive

13

10

29

6

Source: 1998 SAMP Southern African Surveys
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Table 13: Expectations of Treatment in South Africa
What kind of treatment do you
expect in South Africa?
Lesotho

Mozambique

Namibia

Zimbabwe

From Black South Africans
Bad/very bad

14

22

13

28

Good/very good

87

45

60

37

Bad/very bad

12

7

12

15

Good/very good

81

57

64

45

Bad/very bad

8

27

11

22

Good/very good

87

28

62

37

Bad/very bad

8

37

13

33

Good/very good

88

25

62

33

From Other SADC Citizens

SA Immigration Officials

SA Police Officers

Source: 1998 SAMP Southern African Surveys

entirely consistent with other research that shows that citizens of these
two countries have been targeted in the deportation campaign.55
The more focused SAMP survey of migrants and non-citizens living
within South Africa produced broadly similar results. Certainly not
everyone has had, or admits to having, negative experiences. Asked, for
example, about their general experiences in South Africa, 64% said it
had been positive or very positive, with only 20% saying it was negative
or very negative. Follow-up questions about fairness of treatment while
in South Africa (Table 14) showed again that while the foreign experience in South Africa is not uniformly positive, a significant minority
find little to complain about in their treatment by ordinary South
Africans and the authorities.
All of this suggests that the majority of migrants and immigrants are
very much aware of the negativity that surrounds their presence in the
country. However, only those who have had direct personal experience of
hostility, abuse or prejudice are prepared to translate that general awareness into a firm belief that South Africans are intolerant and hostile.
This highlights a paradox in the data. There is still a considerable
gap between belief and action. The vast majority of South Africans
hold negative views about all categories of migrant and immigrant and
are unprepared to extend to them the rights actually guaranteed by their
own constitution.
Many migrants and immigrants are aware that South Africans are
not favourably disposed towards people from their home country. Yet
they are also surprisingly generous in their expectations of South
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Table 14: Perceptions of Treatment by South Africans
Extent to which:

Always

To a large
extent

To some
extent

Hardly at all

Never

Don’t
know

People from your
country are treated
unfairly by
South Africans

13

16

46

16

3

6

People from your
country treated
unfairly by South
African Government

5

13

38

20

16

9

You personally
are treated unfairly
by South Africans

9

14

38

17

22

-

You personally
are treated unfairly
by South African
Government

4

9

31

19

36

2

Since you have
Very
been in SA, have
Good
you received good
or bad treatment from

Good

Neither
good
nor bad

Bad

Very bad

Not
Don’t
applicable know
(Do not
read)

Other people from
your country

29

50

14

3

2

1

1

Other people from
Southern African
countries

9

47

24

6

5

8

1

White South Africans

7

34

33

13

4

6

3

Black South Africans

5

30

28

22

12

2

1

Employers

5

20

18

12

2

41

3

Landowners/
Landlords

7

37

20

9

5

20

2

Government officials,
eg customs and
immigration officials

5

28

32

20

9

4

2

Police officers

3

20

35

19

14

8

1

Africans. They expect to be treated well and, with the exception of
those who have had direct negative experiences, they believe that they
will be, not only by ordinary South Africans but by the police as well.
But the situation is finely balanced.
Earlier sections of this paper showed that the majority of South
Africans are attitudinally hostile to outsiders but that they are not yet
prepared to translate those attitudes into action; at worst they are
“latent xenophobes.” They also suggest that the single biggest mitigator
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of negative stereotyping is personal familiarity. In other words, as South
Africans become more socially familiar with non-South Africans their
attitudes begin to change positively. This, in turn, suggests that public
education programmes (the preaching of tolerance and good neighbourliness in the abstract) are likely to be unsuccessful. What is
required from those in government and the media is a new approach.
Instead of isolating and stigmatizing all migrants as “aliens” and “foreigners”, there needs to be acceptance and promotion of the presence and
contribution of non-citizens to the country’s growth and development.

CONCLUSIONS

T

he South African Human Rights Commission has received
generous publicity and high-level political endorsement for its
anti-racism campaign. By contrast, its efforts to counter xenophobia and publicize the poor treatment of migrants have not
met with anything like the same enthusiasm.56 The struggle to articulate
and advance a rights-based culture for migrants has lined up NGO’s,
unions and the South African Human Rights Commission against the
authorities.
In public policy terms, the widely-praised Draft Green Paper on
International Migration called for a rights-based approach as a fundamental pillar of any new immigration system.57 But the White Paper on
International Migration and Draft Immigration Bill effectively downgraded the rights emphasis of its predecessor.58
This overview paper has identified the enormity of the public education challenge of building a rights-based culture that includes migrants
in a highly polarized society. The size of the public education and antixenophobia challenge that confronts the ANC government is clearly
revealed in the following conclusions from this overview of the findings
of SAMP and other research:
• Nationally-representative surveys reveal high levels of societal
intolerance towards non-citizens (whether legal and illegal,
immigrants or migrants, refugees or asylum-seekers). South
Africans are not unique in this regard but the extent of the public education challenge is much greater here.
• Hostility to foreign citizens in the country does not appear to be
confined to any one racial, social or economic group of South
Africans. It is widespread and pervasive.
• On many indices the South African population shows a 70:30 or
60:40 split. More research is necessary to identify (a) a profile of
the minority of South Africans who hold more favourable
attitudes to outsiders; and (b) whether South African dislike of
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foreigners is based on attitudes or interests. In other words, is
hostility to migrants part of a more general dislike of different
people and groups; or is it based on a perceived threat by immigrants to the material and other interests of South Africans.
• Not all non-citizens are perceived or treated equally. The great
divide, as in many aspects of South African social life, is racial.
White immigrants and migrants are not immune from the subtler forms of South African resentment but their presence does
not prompt the kind of panic and hostility that seems to attach
to African migrants, immigrants and refugees.
• South Africans’ first-hand contact with other Africans in the
country is relatively limited. Hostile attitudes are mainly driven
not by experience but by stereotype and myth. Here the South
African media and officialdom can play a major role in educating the public to the dangers of xenophobia.
South Africa has made enormous strides since 1994 in building a
non-racial, human rights culture appropriate to the new democratic
order. But there are clearly considerable obstacles to be overcome before
the government and the citizenry are prepared to embrace the notion of
equal treatment for foreigners and to ensure that migrants (whether
legal or undocumented) are constitutionally entitled to basic human
and labour rights, simply by virtue of being on South African soil.
Unless there is political will and leadership to strike out in a new direction, it is hard to see how even the best of public education campaigns
will effect the necessary shift in public attitudes. In that context, the
World Conference provides an opportunity for South Africans to reflect
on and seek advice on how to turn back the insidious tide of racism and
xenophobia.
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APPENDIX A
BRAAMFONTEIN STATEMENT ON XENOPHOBIA
SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, 15 OCTOBER 1998.
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

The movement of people within and across boundaries of states and communities has become a feature of modern societies. In the global society, states
can no longer live in isolation from one another. The movement of people
across boundaries has caused and continues to cause problems between
nationals of recipient states and non-nationals because of competition for
scarce resources, ignorance and prejudice. For states, migration raises questions of security, economic management and sovereignty.
Xenophobia is the deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient
state. Its manifestation is a violation of human rights. South Africa needs to
send out a strong message that an irrational prejudice and hostility towards
non-nationals is not acceptable under any circumstances. Criminal behaviour towards foreigners cannot be tolerated in a democratic society.
Our Constitution states that we seek to construct a society where “human
dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights
and freedoms” are abiding values. The Bill of Rights confers certain rights to
“everyone”. These are the rights to equality, human dignity, the right to life,
freedom and security of the person, and the right not to be subject to slavery,
servitude or forced labour.
Our international obligations have both a legal and a moral force. South
Africa is party to international human rights and humanitarian treaties, especially on refugees and asylum-seekers.
No one, whether in this country legally or not, can be deprived of his or her
basic or fundamental rights and cannot be treated as less than human. The
mere fact of being an alien or being without legal status does not mean that
one is fair game to all manner of exploitation or violence or to criminal,
arbitrary or inhuman treatment. Foreigners in our midst are entitled to the
support and defence of our law and constitution.
Despite the above provisions, in practice there is an increasing level of
Xenophobia in our country. Xenophobia is thus a blight on our democratic
values and should be eradicated.
In this regard, the South African Human Rights Commission and other
stakeholders from government and non-governmental sectors held a one day
consultative conference to discuss the increasing rate of Xenophobia as a violation of human rights and our constitutional values. The Conference was
held at the Johannesburg Metropolitan Civil Centre, Braamfontein on
Thursday, 15 October 1998.
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7.
8.

The Consultative Conference adopted the following Programme of Action:
There should be a co-ordinated approach between various government
departments to address Xenophobia and the manifestations thereof.
9. Migration and refugee policies should be clear, coherent, implementable and
reflect South Africa’s constitutional and international obligations.
10. South Africa should take steps to sign the International Convention on the
Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families and other
relevant treaties. This should be done in order to signal South Africa’s commitment to abide by international standards in her treatment of resident
non-nationals.
11. Factors that encourage the manifestation of Xenophobia such as poverty,
unemployment, crime, corruption in the immigration and police services and
ignorance about the role and significance of non-nationals in our country
should be addressed. The rights and responsibilities of non-nationals should
also be taken into account.
12. As part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region,
South Africa should play her part in the development of the economic policies in the region in order to enhance peace and prosperity in the neighbouring states and ensure opportunities for betterment of life for its citizens.
13. A nation-wide public awareness and information campaign on racism and
Xenophobia and its effects should be organised.
14. Public service officials should undergo training on racism and Xenophobia,
on the theory and practice of migration and refugee policies and on the
understanding of international human rights and humanitarian instruments
as well as develop an awareness of the social and political situation in the
countries responsible for the influx of migrants to South Africa.
15. South African are urged to practice African cultural values like ubuntu
(“hospitality and solidarity”) in their relations with others in their midst.
16. The South African Human Rights Commission, assisted by a steering group
drawn from the departments of Home Affairs, Justice and provincial Safety
and Security, are mandated to monitor the implementation of these proposals.
Johannesburg 15 October 1998
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APPENDIX B
CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS (COSATU)
STATEMENT ON XENOPHOBIA
8 February 2001
For two weeks the SABC, through the Two Way and Special Assignment
programmes have been showing the level of xenophobia in the country.
COSATU is shocked and disgusted to note that the problem of xenophobia has grown to unacceptable proportions. What angers COSATU even
more is that most of the hatred is directed at the migrants of African origin. Only six years after South Africa defeated a system that was condemned by the democratic world as a crime against humanity – the
apartheid system, it is regretful that white hatred and oppression of fellow
black South Africans is being replaced by hatred of migrants from Africa.
Incidents previously reported in the press, as well as those screened by
SABC, such as throwing acid on a fellow human, clearly put some sections of our population at the same wave length as the Nazis of Germany.
A section of our population argues that the high unemployment rate
and crime is as a result of the number of illegal and legal migrants from
Africa. Looking at the facts, one clearly will see that South Africans are
using the migrants as scapegoats. According to the home affairs there
are an estimated 200 000 illegal immigrants and 60 000 refugees in
South Africa.
While the figures quoted above give a broad picture, they should be
treated with caution since we do not have an accurate picture of the
extent of illegal migration into South Africa. The extent of illegal
immigrants is sometimes exaggerated to suggest that we have been
flooded. Unfortunately, due to prejudice, people no longer distinguish
between illegal immigrants and refugees, asylum seekers and other legal
migrants.
The unemployment rate in our country is 36%. An estimated 5 million are out of work. Even if all these illegal immigrants and refugees
were working in South Africa, our problem of unemployment would
still be of the same crisis proportions as is currently the case.
Crime, poverty and unemployment go hand in glove. It is simply not
true that crime is caused by migrants. Yes, a number of migrants have
been arrested for various criminal activities. It is improper that from
these isolated incidents, there is an unfair generalisation that illegal and
other migrants are responsible for crime in general. This perception
should be addressed head-on, as it is simply not accurate. The overwhelming majority of prisoners for example are South Africans rather
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than illegal immigrants.
The South African government spends millions of rands repatriating
alleged illegal immigrants but has not managed to stem the flow of illegal immigrants into South Africa. This points to the underlying socioeconomic crisis within Africa and the region. Most immigrants are desperate enough to jump off moving trains, walk across the Kruger
National Park, risking death rather than face the hunger in their own
countries. This is the reason why COSATU has been calling for the
convening of a Southern African Regional Summit between key stakeholders to discuss a regional development programme to build and
revive the economies of the region and Africa. There will be no successful South African reconstruction and development when it is surrounded by a sea of poverty.
Unscrupulous employers that are taking advantage of the situation
must be condemned, equally police who ill-treat illegal migrants in a
manner similar to their past attitudes. Invariably, African immigrants
receive the worst treatment from the police, suggesting that elements in
the police force are still trapped in the apartheid era.
Concrete steps should be taken by the authorities to halt this superexploitation of migrants. The bosses who are employing illegal immigrants, clearly with the view of sidestepping fair labour market laws,
must be severely punished. Police who treat the immigrants as sub
human beings must be severely punished.
The corrupt and inefficient Department of Home Affairs officials
must be removed and replaced by more humane officials who understand the challenge of transformation. The Minister of Home Affairs
must launch an investigation into rampant corruption and inefficiency
that have been exposed by the Special Assignment programme, including the fact that it takes the refugees up to three months to get the necessary papers and that, in addition, some of them must bribe corrupt
officials to get these documents.
The government, civil society formations and all organs of the state
must prioritise the fighting of xenophobia. Like racism and tribalism,
xenophobia must be defeated lest we slowly turn into a fascist society
that will grow into a new polecat of the world.
The coming UN Conference on racism will play an important role
in helping to develop a plan to deal with the scourge of racism, xenophobia and tribalism.
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